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DEPORTABILITY, DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
Immigration Law encompasses a substantial number of sub-topics,
ranging from determinations of asylum status to judicial jurisdiction to
hear appeals to consular access.' Plenary power over immigration be-
longs to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution,
which grants the federal legislature the power "to establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States."2 Congress's
authority over immigration and naturalization has faced little challenge
throughout the nation's history, as the United States Supreme Court has
held that the right to exclude aliens is a "fundamental act of sover-
eignty.",3 However, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held "that
all individuals within U.S. borders enjoy constitutional protection,'"
Congress's actions as they relate to aliens in America must be consistent
with Due Process.5
Because of the massive scope of Immigration and Naturalization
Law, the following survey will focus only on two major sub-topics: the
aggravated felony category and the detention of lawful permanent resi-
dents. Part I addresses the aggravated felony category, which may be
applied to aliens in two ways - first, by making a lawful permanent resi-
dent deportable, 6 and, second, by increasing the sentence of a previously
deported alien found to have illegally entered the United States after de-
portation.7 Part II will discuss the detention of aliens, under the Illegal
I. For an updated discussion of developments in the full range of Immigration Law, see
Federal Court Update: Summaries of Recent Immigration Decisions, 78 No. 36 INTER. REL. 1485
(Sept. 2001). West Group releases these updates, containing a report and analysis of immigration
and nationality law, monthly.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
3. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). For a general
discussion of Congress's plenary power over immigration law, see Daniel R. Dinger, When We
Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim Procedures Governing Detention, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1551, 1555-63 (2000) (discussing the intersection of Congress's plenary power over immigration
with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process provision); see generally Melinda Smith, Criminal
Defense Attorneys and Noncitizen Clients: Understanding Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law &
How Recent Changes in Those Laws May Affect Your Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163
(1999) (examining both the sociological and legal history of immigration in America).
4. Lisa Cox, The Legal Limbo of Indefinite Detention: How Long Can You Go?, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 725, 742 (2001).
5. See id. at 742-43.
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001) (classifying as deportable "any alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission").
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2001) (making it a crime to re-enter the United States following a
deportation). Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1 .2(b)(l)(A) allow a sixteen-level increase in base offense
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Immigration Reform and Death Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IRIRA"), which provides for the detention of an alien pending re-
moval as an aggravated felon, prior to the completion of such removal
proceedings.!
I. THE AGGRAVATED FELONY REQUIREMENT: 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(III)
A. Background: The Evolution of the Aggravated Felony Definition
The aggravated felony penalty as applied to aliens first appeared in
a 1988 anti-drug law, reflecting a Congressional effort to rid the nation
of its least desirable aliens.9 Although the original aggravated felony
category included only murder, drug-trafficking and firearms
trafficking,"° the categorical definition has expanded with virtually every
major crime and immigration act since then." Both the 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")'2 and the
IIRIRA 3 greatly expanded the category.
4
Today, the category includes a lengthy list of crimes, ranging from
the original offenses of the 1988 act to prostitution and pornography of-
fenses, from fraud and forgery to a repeat conviction for drug
possession.'5 Perhaps the most significant expansion of the category was
accomplished by reducing the minimum sentencing requirement.' 6 While
the category formerly included offenses receiving a five-year minimum
sentence, today the category includes offenses with only one-year mini-
mum sentences; "[t]he effect of this is to render virtually all non-
regulatory felonies aggravated felonies ... Notably, the definition re-
level for an alien who re-enters after deportation based on a conviction for an "aggravated felony."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (2001).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2001) (allowing the Attorney General to release an alien
deportable under § 1227 only if that release is necessary for the purposes of a separate criminal
investigation, provided that "the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of
property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding").
9. See 1988 Anti Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 100-690 § 7342 (hereinafter 1988 Act). For a
general overview of the evolution of the Aggravated Felony category, see Kari Converse, Criminal
Law Reforms: Defending Immigrants in Peril, 21 AUG. CHAMPION 10, 11-12 (1997); Robert James
McWhirter, Hell Just Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigration Consequences
to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, II GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 515 -20 (1997).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2001).
11. See McWhirter, supra note 9, at 518.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (hereinafter AEDPA).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (1996) (hereinafter IIRIRA).
14. See McWhirter, supra note 9, at 515-20.
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2001).
16. See Converse, supra note 9, at 11 -12.
17. Id. at 11.
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ceives retroactive application, with potentially devastating consequences
for some resident aliens."
In the years since the passage of the 1996 acts, many lawful perma-
nent residents have faced deportation proceedings, including several
whom Congress most likely would not have considered undesirable or
deportable.' 9 Some of these aliens may have received only suspended
sentences at a time when their offenses were not considered aggravated
felonies for deportation purposes, and have lived in the United States for
several years since their convictions, with no further criminal activity. 20
Consider Xuan Wilson, who came to America from Vietnam at age
four, wrote a forged check for $19.83 in 1989, and "now faces deporta-
tion to a homeland she hardly remembers, as well as a permanent bar
against any future re-entry into the United States.",2' Likewise, Sokhom
Oeur, a Cambodian refugee who arrived in the States as a teenager, now
faces deportation based on an assault conviction, for which he received
only a suspended sentence, stemming from his self-defensive use of a
weapon when threatened by a group of young men in 1995.22 By greatly
expanding the aggravated felony category, and by applying it retroac-
tively, "Congress cast a big net, and they're catching some dolphins in
it.
,,2
This survey will focus on two categories of crimes used by the INS
as a basis for invoking deportation proceedings. First, this survey will
address the transportation of aliens as a potential "aggravated felony."
While the IRIRA refers to an offense "relating to alien smuggling,"24 the
courts have recently had an opportunity to determine if the offense in-
cludes the transportation of aliens strictly within American borders.25
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have held that the transpor-
tation of aliens falls within an aggravated felony category for deportation
purposes, and have, thus, further expanded the category from its original
form in 1988.26
Second, the survey will address another frequent conviction that
may result in deportation, driving Under the influence. The Tenth Circuit
has disagreed with all other circuits in its interpretation of the "crime of
violence" sub-category within the aggravated felony category, particu-
18. See Smith, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the potential of AEDPA to "put legal resident
aliens in jeopardy of removal for even minor offenses which may have been committed years ago").
19. See generally Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets - Immigration
Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12 IMMIGR. L.J. 589 (1998).
20. See id. at 590-92.
21. Id. at 591.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 589 (quoting Russ Bergeron, INS spokesman).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(N) (2001).
25. See United States v. Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001); Ruiz-Romero v.
Reno, 205 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2000).
26. See Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d at 1248; Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 840.
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larly as it applies to drunk-driving convictions.27 The definition of aggra-
vated felony includes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of
title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense)
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.''28 While four
other circuits have considered the issue and determined that a DUI con-
viction does not constitute an aggravated felony,29 the Tenth Circuit re-
cently concluded that a DUI conviction constitutes a "crime of violence,"
and, therefore, satisfies the aggravated felony requirement for the insti-
tution of deportation proceedings.30
B. Transportation of Aliens as an Aggravated Felony
1. Tenth Circuit: United States v. Salas-Mendoza3'
a. Facts
In United States v. Salas-Mendoza, the defendant, Leobardo Salas-
Mendoza, was convicted of one count of re-entry of a removed alien in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) 2 The district court, in sentencing him to
84 months imprisonment, increased his base offense level by 16 points as
required by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).33 The Sentencing Guidelines re-
quire that where a defendant is initially deported based upon an aggra-
vated felony, his base sentence be increased by 16 points.34 Salas-
Mendoza was previously convicted of transporting aliens in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 3 Salas-Mendoza challenged the court's
finding that a conviction for the transportation of aliens constituted an
aggravated felony for sentencing purposes, noting the distinction be-
tween "alien smuggling," which necessarily requires cross-border
movement, and mere transportation, which involves only intra-country
movement.36
27. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Title 18, section 16, defines "crime of violence" as "(a) an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2001).
29. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257
F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Bazan-
Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
30. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
31. 237 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001).








Salas-Mendoza's claim that the definition of "aggravated felony" as
found in 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(N), which includes "an offense de-
scribed in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of §1324(a) of this title (relating to
alien smuggling)," is limited by the parenthetical text, was rejected by
the Tenth Circuit.37 The court expressly rejected the defendant's claim
that the "smuggling of aliens, by definition, requires the movement of
aliens across the border between Mexico and the United States whereas
transportation of aliens involves the movement of aliens solely within the
United States."38 The Tenth Circuit's analysis relied on case law from the
Fifth Circuit, which ruled that the parenthetical "relating to alien smug-
gling" served to describe, rather than to limit, the offenses listed in §
1324(a).39
The court further found a clear relationship between the transporta-
tion and smuggling of aliens based on both the language of the statute
and congressional intent.' ° The court noted that the enumerated offenses
listed in § 1324(a) all involve "the transportation, movement and hiding
of aliens whether crossing into or within the United States."' It bolstered
this reading by contrasting the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N) with
those parentheticals elsewhere in § 1101 that expressly limit offenses. 2
Additionally, the court inferred from Congress's continuing expansion of
§ 1324 since its initial passage an intent to include the act of transporta-
tion within the anti-smuggling laws.43 Having determined that the trans-
portation of aliens fell within the offenses listed in the aggravated felony
category, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Salas-Mendoza's increased sen-
tence.44
2. Fifth Circuit: Ruiz-Romero v. Reno 5
a. Facts
Less than a year prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Salas-
Mendoza, the Fifth Circuit had the occasion to consider the same issue in
Ruiz-Romero v. Reno. Here, the defendant, who had achieved lawful
permanent resident status in 1990, was convicted of transporting eight
37. See id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
38. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1247.
39. See id. (citing United States v. Monjares-Castaneda, 190 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1999)).
40. See id.
41. Id. at 1247.
42. See id. at 1248.
43. See id. at 1247.
44. See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1248.
45. 205 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Mexican aliens within the state of New Mexico alone, in violation of §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).4 The law penalizes:
[Any person who] knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in viola-
tion of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move
such alien within the United States by means of transportation or oth-
erwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.47
Ruiz-Romero was consequently facing deportation proceedings
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)A)(iii). 48 The defendant moved to ter-
minate the deportation proceedings on the ground that his conviction for
the transportation of aliens did not constitute an "aggravated felony.'49
After the immigration judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals ("BIA") upheld that order, the defendant appealed to the
Fifth Circuit. °
b. Decision
As in Salas-Mendoza, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether the parenthetical phrase found in § 1101 (a)(43)(N) ("relating to
alien smuggling") limited or described the statutory definition of aggra-
vated felony preceding it." Here, the court relied on its own precedent of
United States v. Monjaras-Castaneda,52 which held in a sentencing-
guidelines context that the parenthetical phrase served only a descriptive,
rather than restrictive, purpose. 3 Reaffirming the statutory construction
found in Monjaras-Castaneda, the Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA's finding
that the transportation of aliens within American borders constituted an
aggravated felony for deportation proceedings. 4
3. Analysis
The combined rulings of the Tenth Circuit, in Salas-Mendoza, and
the Fifth Circuit, in Ruiz-Romero, suggest that the transportation of aliens
within American borders constitutes an aggravated felony for both sen-
tencing and deportation purposes." However, the broad definition and
sweeping categorical approach applied by the courts may result in some
extremely harsh consequences for some aliens. Consider the following
hypothetical. A lawful permanent resident lives in a tight-knit immigrant
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1997).
47. Id.




52. 190 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999).
53. See Monjaras-Castaneda, 190 F.3d at 329.
54. See Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 839.
55. See Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d at 1246-47; Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 839.
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community in San Antonio, Texas. He agrees to drive a group of his
neighbors to Dallas, Texas. Not having determined the legal status of any
of his passengers, the lawful permanent resident, through his "reckless
disregard" for the illegal status of his neighbors, has committed an ag-
gravated felony and will be subject to deportation proceedings for his
neighborly act. Surely, this is not the sort of activity that Congress in-
tended to target.
Consider the following actual scenario. One resident alien, origi-
nally from Canada and married to a United States citizen, was ruled de-
portable for what most would consider a harmless exercise of poor
judgment. 6 In 1985, Gabriela Dee, at the age of twenty, sought to help
her Israeli boyfriend sneak across the Canadian border into the States. 7
The brief legal proceeding that followed imposed only a $25 fine for her
"alien smuggling" conviction.5 ' Eleven years later, when the INS was
reviewing Dee's application for permanent residency, they discovered
the conviction, "retroactively applied the new aggravated felon provi-
sions to Dee's case, and commenced deportation proceedings against
her."5 9
In both of these situations, a seemingly innocent (or at least rela-
tively harmless) act renders the actor, an otherwise lawful and upstand-
ing American resident, subject to deportation proceedings. But these
actors are not committing the heinous crime most of us imagine when we
refer to "alien smuggling." Contrast their actions with the 1993 "Golden
Venture" tragedy, where a dilapidated freighter carrying approximately
285 illegal Chinese immigrants washed upon the shore of the Rockaway
Peninsula in Queens, New York, resulting in the death of at least six pas-
sengers.6° More recently, Jesus Lopez-Ramos plead guilty to alien smug-
gling charges after smuggling in dozens of illegal immigrants across the
Mexican border, leaving 14 of them to die in the Arizona desert.6' Surely
these are the sorts of criminal acts Congress envisioned when it added
62the offense of "alien smuggling" to the aggravated felony requirement.
By construing the "alien smuggling" category so broadly, the courts have
expanded its scope with unintended consequences for countless resident
aliens.
56. See Coonan, supra note 19, at 590-91.
57. See id. at 591.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Maritime Slave Trade: A 21' Century Problem?, 7 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495, 501 (2001).
61. See Man Admits Alien Smuggling, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2001, at A, available at
2001 WL 28417985.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(N).
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. Driving Under the Influence: Aggravated Felony?
In the past year, several circuits have addressed the issue of whether
a drunk driving conviction (either a DUI or a DWI) constitutes a "crime
of violence" so as to fall within the aggravated felony category,63 thereby
resulting in either deportation or an increased sentence following an ille-
gal reentry into the United States.64 Out of the five circuits addressing the
issue, only the Tenth Circuit found that a drunk driving conviction con-
stitutes a "crime of violence" as intended by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).65 The remaining circuits all
construed the "crime of violence" definition as excluding drunk-driving
offenses, based not only on a reading of the definition itself, but also on
the distinction between the definition as found at 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and
as found in the Sentencing Guidelines. 6
1. Tenth Circuit: Tapia Garcia v. INS7
a. Facts
Jose G. Tapia-Garcia was a Mexican citizen but a legal permanent
resident of the United States when he received a conviction for driving
under the influence in Idaho in 1998. 8 Tapia-Garcia served only two
months of his five year sentence before being released, and the INS sub-
sequently commenced deportation proceedings against him based on his
conviction for an "aggravated felony" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 69 An immigration judge concluded that Tapia-Garcia's
DUI offense satisfied the "crime of violence" category of the "aggra-
vated felony" conviction, and ordered Tapia-Garcia's removal to Mex-
ico.70 The BIA affirmed the judge's finding, dismissing Tapia-Garcia's
appeal and issuing a final removal order that resulted in Tapia-Garcia's
deportation to Mexico.7'
b. Decision
The central issue before the court was whether Idaho's DUI offense
constituted an "aggravated felony," and therefore rendered Tapia-Garcia
63. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza
243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. See discussion regarding the significance of an aggravated felony conviction supra Part I-
A.
65. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
66. See discussion infra Part I-C, 2 -5.
67. 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).






subject to deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)." In order to determine the issue, the court looked to
the definition of aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F),
which included "crime of violence" as described in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
Tapia-Garcia claimed that Idaho's DUI offense did not constitute a
crime of violence "because it does not 'by its nature involve a substantial
risk that physical force... may be used in the course of committing the
offense,"' as required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 4 Rather, argued the defen-
dant, the statute was written broadly, so as to encompass both violent and
nonviolent crimes.75
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the defendant's argument,
declining to consider the DUI offense in light of the particular facts of
the defendant's case, and instead applying a "categorical approach that
considers only the generic elements of the offense.7 6 The court's analy-
sis relied upon BIA precedent, which called for a categorical approach to
the "crime of violence" analysis, requiring that "'the nature of the crime
- as elucidated by the generic elements of the offense - is such that its
commission would ordinarily present a risk that physical force would be
used against the property of another' irrespective of whether the risk
develops or harm actually occurs.' ' 77 Moreover, the court invoked an-
other BIA decision, which held that a state DUI offense constituted a
"crime of violence," so long as the offense was considered a felony un-
der state law, and which noted that "the statutory definition of crime of
violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) did not require intentional conduct.
78
Finally, the court looked to federal precedent, including its own,
which held that driving under the influence constituted a "crime of vio-
lence" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines.79 Based on the cate-
gorical approach to the "crime of violence" analysis, and the federal
Sentencing Guidelines precedent, the Tenth Circuit concluded that an
Idaho DUI offense constituted a "crime of violence" within the aggra-
vated felony definitions, and therefore rendered the defendant subject to
deportation proceedings.8s
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1221.
74. Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1221.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1221-22.
77. Id. at 1222 (quoting Matter of Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341, 1998
WL133301 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (quoting Matter of Alcantar, 20 1. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA 1994),
available at 1994 WL 232083).
78. Id. (citing Matter of Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412, 1999 WL 770709 (BIA Sept.
29, 1999).
79. See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1222-23.
80. See id at 1223.
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2. Fifth Circuit: United States v. Chapa-Garza8'
a. Facts
In United States v. Chapa-Garza, the Fifth Circuit considered the
consolidated appeals of five defendants separately convicted of unlawful
presence in the United States after being deported.82 All defendants faced
increased sentences upon a finding that their prior removal from the
United States was based upon an "aggravated felony., 83 As in Tapia
Garcia, the court's decision turned upon whether a conviction for a state
drunk driving felony, here a Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") charge,
constituted a "crime of violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). '
b. Decision
The Fifth Circuit's analysis set forth three reasons for determining
that the DWI does not constitute a "crime of violence," and therefore is
not an aggravated felony that would result in increased sentences for the
defendants.85 First, the court declined to interpret the "crime of violence"
language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to include the same offenses as the defini-
tion set forth in Sentencing Guideline § 4B 1.2(a)(2), which includes "any
offense that involves 'pure recklessness,' i.e. a conscious disregard of a
substantial risk of injury to others.8 6 Instead, the court relied upon an
alternative reading of § 16(b), which "applies only when the nature of the
offense is such that there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator
will intentionally employ physical force against another's person or
property in the commission thereof."87 In reaching this decision, the court
distinguishes Sentencing Guideline § 4B 1.2(a)(2), which considers the
effect of the defendant's conduct, from 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which considers
the conduct itself.8  Moreover, the court noted that the definition of crime
of violence found in the Sentencing Guidelines was changed in 1989
from a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to the new, broader definition cur-
rently found there.89 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that this change in
definition suggests that the two standards must be interpreted
differently. 9°
The second reason given by the Fifth Circuit for its holding was that
the relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), "'substantial risk that physi-
81. 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001).
82. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
83. See id.
84. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 923.
85. See id. at 924.
86. Id. at 925.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 926.
90. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926.
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cal force... may be used' contemplates only reckless disregard for the
probability that intentional force may be employed."9' The court viewed
this construction, which favors a requirement of intentional conduct on
the part of the defendant, as opposed to requiring only an "accidental,
unintended event," as the most reasonable interpretation of the phrase
"may be used." 92
Finally, the Fifth Circuit stated, "the physical force described in §
16(b) is that 'used in the course of committing the offense,' not that force
that could result from the offense having been committed., 93 Again, the
focus is on the intent of the perpetrator and on the conduct itself, as op-
posed to the unintended effects that may result from such conduct. Based
on these factors, the Fifth Circuit determined that force is not intention-
ally "used" against another person by the perpetrator of a DWI, and,
therefore, a DWI felony does not constitute a "crime of violence," as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).94
3. Seventh Circuit: Bazan-Reyes v. INS'5
a. Facts
In Bazan-Reyes v. INS, the Seventh Circuit addressed the consoli-
dated appeals of three resident aliens facing removal based on state
drunk driving offenses under Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin law. 96 De-
fendant Bazan-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, had been a legal resident in the
United States for eleven years prior to his Indiana DWI conviction. 9 De-
fendant Maciasowicz, a Polish citizen, had been a lawful permanent resi-
dent for nearly five years when he pled guilty to two counts of homicide
by intoxicated use of a vehicle under Wisconsin law.98 The third defen-
dant, Gomez-Vela, was a Mexican citizen admitted as a lawful perma-
nent resident in 197 1.99 After twenty-five years of residence, Gomez was
charged with aggravated driving under the influence based on two prior
DUI convictions in Illinois.'00
b. Decision
The Seventh Circuit faced the question of whether state drunk driv-
ing offenses constituted "aggravated felonies" for deportation purposes,
as all three defendants had received removal orders from the INS based
91. Id. at 924 (emphasis in original).
92. See id. at 926.
93. Id. at 924.
94. See id. at 927.
95. 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
96. See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 602.
97. See id.
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on their convictions.' °' The court ultimately rejected decisions by the INS
and the BIA, which had ruled that state drunk driving offenses consti-
tuted aggravated felonies because they were crimes of violence, as de-
fined by 18 U.S.C. § 16.102
Relying on its own precedent, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
their prior "finding that the word 'use' requires volitional conduct pro-
hibits a finding that drunk driving is a crime of violence under § 16(a). '' 3
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza,
distinguished between "crime of violence" as defined in § 16 and as de-
fined in the Sentencing Guidelines.""' Accordingly, the court held that a
"crime of violence" finding, for aggravated felony purposes, "is limited
to crimes in which the offender is reckless with respect to the risk that
intentional physical force will be used in the course of committing the
offense."'0 5 The court then applied a categorical approach to the drunk
driving statutes, and determined that "intentional force" is almost never
used to commit such offenses.' ° The court concluded, therefore, that the
drunk-driving offenses did not constitute crimes of violence, and that the
defendants were therefore not convicted of aggravated felonies for re-
moval purposes. '°7 In reaching its decision, the court specifically rejected
the Tenth Circuit's contrary determination that drunk driving is a crime
of violence.'08
4. Second Circuit: Dalton v. Ashcroft' °9
a. Facts
In Dalton v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit reviewed the decision of
the BIA, which upheld an immigration judge's order of removal based on
a resident alien's DWI conviction." ° The petitioner, Thomas Anthony
Dalton, although a citizen of Canada, had been living in the United States
as a lawful permanent resident since 1958, prior to his first birthday.'"
Dalton's parents and siblings were also residing in the United States at
the time of his deportation proceedings.' 2 In 1998, Dalton pled guilty to
a DWI offense, and based on two previous convictions within the pre-
101. See id. at 604.
102. See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 605.
103. Id. at 609.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 612.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 612.
108. See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610.
109. 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001).
110. See Dalton, 257 F.3d. at 203.




ceding ten years, Dalton's crime and sentence were increased to a class
D felony under New York law."3
Subsequently, while Dalton was serving his prison sentence, the
INS began removal proceedings against him as an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony. ' 4 An immigration judge ordered Dalton removed
without the opportunity to request relief, and the BIA affirmed."5 The
BIA's decision relied on its own precedent, as well as a Fifth Circuit
opinion which was later withdrawn, in determining that a DWI convic-
tion under New York law constituted a "crime of violence," and there-
fore fell within an aggravated felony category.116
b. Decision
The Second Circuit applied a categorical approach to its statutory
interpretation of the New York DWI statute. ' '7 In doing so, the court re-
lied upon recent language of the New York Court of Appeals regarding
the statute, which noted the "sweeping" nature of conduct covered by the
statute. ' 8 The court noted the many situations in which a person could be
convicted under the New York statute, including situations where an
intoxicated person is found asleep at the wheel of a car that is neither in
motion nor running.'"9 Comparing the broad range of conduct covered by
the New York statute to the federal "crime of violence" definition, the
court concluded that a New York DWI conviction did not necessarily
involve the "use of physical force" as required by the "crime of violence"
definition.' 2 The Second Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza,
distinguished between the "risk of injury" and a risk of the "use of physi-




5. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Trinidad-Aquino'
22
a. Facts
In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a prior deportation based on a California DUI conviction should
result in an elevated sentence due to the aggravated felony penalty.' 23 The
defendant, Trinidad-Aquino, received a 1994 conviction for driving un-
113. Id.
114. See id. at 203.
115. See id.
116. See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203.
117. See id. at 204.
118. See id. at 205.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 206.
121. See id. at 207.
122. 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
123. See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1142.
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der the influence of alcohol with bodily injury under California law and
was subsequently deported. 24 Five years later, Trinidad-Aquino pled
guilty to illegally re-entering the United States following a deportation
order.' 25 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, if a defendant was previously
deported after receiving an "aggravated felony" conviction, a sixteen-
level increase in base offense will be applied to his sentence. 126 The dis-
trict court, ruling that Trinidad-Aquino's prior DUI conviction did not
satisfy the "aggravated felony" definition, refused to apply this sentenc-
ing increase.'2 7 The government appealed.'
28
b. Decision
The Ninth Circuit upheld the determination of the district court that,
because the DUI conviction required merely "a negligence mens rea"
under California law, the offense was not a "crime of violence" and
therefore did not constitute an aggravated felony for sentencing
129purposes. In reviewing the district court's finding, the Ninth Circuit
applied a categorical approach, based on the statutory definition of the
crime. 30 Following its own precedent of United States v. Baron-
Medina,13 1 the court ruled that, because "'[c]rime of violence' is not a
traditional common law crime ... it can only be construed by consider-
ing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the language
Congress used in defining the crime.' ' 32 The court relied on the word
"use" in the statutory definition for a "crime of violence," holding that
the word "use" as commonly understood involves a "volitional require-
ment absent from negligence.' 33 In applying this understanding of the
"crime of violence" to the case at bar, the court considered not the spe-
cific facts of Trinidad-Aquino's crime, which may have involved a mens
rea above negligence, but only the DUI statute as a whole, which allows
a conviction for mere negligence. ' 3 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a DUI conviction under California law was not sufficient to result in






128. See id. at 1142.
129. See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
130. See id. at 1143.
131. 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1144.
133. Id.





In the last year, five circuits considered the precise issue of whether
a drunk driving violation could constitute an aggravated felony for pur-
poses of both removal proceedings and sentence enhancements after be-
ing convicted of illegal reentry. 3 6 Four circuits found that such an of-
fense cannot constitute an "aggravated felony.' 37 Only the Tenth Circuit
has determined within the last year that a DUI is a "crime of violence,"
and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes."'
However, because the Tenth Circuit issued its decision on January 19,
2001, while the other circuits issued their decisions in March, July and
August of 2001,39 it is questionable whether the Tenth Circuit ruling will
stand, should the same issue arise again.
II. THE MANDATORY DETENTION REQUIREMENT: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
A. Background
1. Generally
IIRIRA provides for the detention of an alien pending removal as an
aggravated felon, prior to the completion of such removal proceedings.'o
IIRIRA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to in-
clude § 236(c), which requires the Attorney General to "take into custody
any alien who ... is deportable by reason of having committed" an ag-
gravated felony, as expanded under IIRIRA.14 ' The 1996 amendment was
not Congress's first attempt at such a stringent detention provision. The
1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA") provided a similar detention re-
quirement for those aliens who had committed "aggravated felonies"'' 2 -
albeit under a much narrower definition of "aggravated felony.' 43 The
majority of courts who reviewed the ADAA's mandatory detention pro-
vision declared it unconstitutional as violating due process.'" Conse-
quently, Congressional amendments in 1990 and 1991 allowed for the
discretionary release of lawful aliens who could demonstrate that they
posed neither flight nor public safety risks.'4 5 The current mandatory de-
136. See cases cited supra notes 66, 80, 94, 108, 121.
137. See cases cited supra notes 80, 94, 108, 121.
138. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
139. See cases cited supra notes 66, 80, 94, 108, 121.
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (allowing the Attorney General to release an alien deportable
under § 1227 only if that release is necessary for the purposes of a separate criminal investigation,
provided that "the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is
likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding").
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).
142. ADAA § 73 4 3(a).
143. See supra notes 8 - 17 and accompanying text.
144. See Ellis M. Johnston, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal? Unconstitutional
Presumptions for Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens, 89 GEO. L.J. 2593, 2597 (2001).
145. See id.
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tention provision represents a Congressional response to a growing pub-
lic perception of the danger of criminal aliens."
The ongoing debate over the rights of lawful permanent resident
aliens within the United States, and the mandatory detention of an alien
prior to a final removal order, has become extremely relevant in light of
the recent terrorist attacks on America and the subsequently enacted leg-
islation.'47 On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA Patriot
Act, a stark piece of anti-terrorism legislation swiftly drafted and passed
in response to the September 11' terrorist attacks on America.14 8 A key
provision of the new law allows "the attorney general to hold foreigners
considered suspected terrorists for up to seven days before charging them
with a crime or beginning deportation proceedings."'4 9 The provision was
a compromise insofar as the administration had initially sought the
authority to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism indefinitely.'
50
Whether the seven-day limit included in the bill will place any ac-
tual restraints on the government's treatment of immigrants is question-
able. The executive branch detained some 700 to 800 immigrants in the
weeks following the attacks,'5 ' and has invoked a variety of justifications
152for doing so. First, the government may hold people as material wit-
nesses if "they are thought to have pertinent information and prosecutors
want to depose them or get them to testify before a grand jury. A mate-
rial witness has a right to a hearing but can be held without bail if he is
considered a flight risk.'
'153
A second group involves individuals detained by the government on
immigration charges, who "can be held virtually indefinitely once de-
portation proceedings have begun.' 54 Although the period of time be-
146. See id. at 2596-97.
147. See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, But
With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL-NYT 0128600053. The
legislation requires the Attorney General to release suspects after seven days, or to charge them with
a criminal or immigration violation. See id.
148. See Bush Signs Sweeping New Laws to Combat Terrorism, Oct. 26, 2001, at
http://news.findlaw.com/politics/s/20011026/attackbushdc.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
149. Id.
150. See Adam Clymer, Senate Passes Anti-Terror Bill to Expand Government's Powers, Oct.
26, 2001, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., available at 2001 WL-NYT 0129900024.
151. See Mae M. Cheng, Detentions Raise Legal Concerns: Some Immigrants held for long
periods, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9257317; Laurie P. Cohen, The Response
to Terror: Material-Witness Warrants in U.S. Draw Criticism, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at
12, available at 2001 WL-WSJA 22059219.
152. See Judy Peres, War on Terror: The Detained, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001, at 8, available
at 2001 WL 4126317.
153. Id.
154. Id. The authority to detain these immigrants virtually indefinitely is discussed in Part II of
this survey. See also Anita Ramasastry, Indefinite Detention Based Upon Suspicion: How the Patriot
Act Will Disrupt Many Lawful Immigrants' Lives, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
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tween detention and the decision to commence deportation proceedings
was traditionally regulated at 48 hours, Attorney General Ashcroft re-
cently expanded it to "48 hours except in emergencies or extraordinary
circumstances, where you can be detained for any reasonable time."'55
With the authority to invoke the current state of "emergency" facing the
country, the Attorney General may effectively detain immigrants guilty
of even the slightest immigration infringements for an unlimited period
of time.
Civil rights groups and attorneys have reacted with great concern
over the detention of immigrants following the September 1 1h attacks.
56
Some of the common concerns include the federal government's failure
to release information regarding "the nationality or ethnicity of many of
the detainees, the criteria authorities are using to pick them up, what kind
of access they have been given to attorneys or how many people have
been released."' 57 So far, a great deal of anecdotal evidence has emerged
to reinforce these concerns. 5 8 Some of the more egregious examples in-
clude the beating of a Pakistani student being held in a Mississippi jail, 9
the holding of a Middle Eastern man for two weeks without allowing him
to contact his attorney, '6° and, for a Saudi man in Texas, the denial of "an
attorney, a mattress, a blanket, a drinking cup and a clock to remind him
when to say his Muslim prayers."'6 '
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
Under section 1226(c), the Attorney General is authorized to release
such "deportable" aliens only if such release:
is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a
person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity,
or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, po-
tential witness , or person cooperating with such an investigation, and
the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a
20011002_ramasastry.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2001) (discussing the potential for detention based
on secret evidence as a serious threat to the constitutional rights of lawful permanent residents living
in the U.S.).
155. Peres, supra note 152.
156. See Toner & Lewis, supra note 147; Editorial, Protect Public, Constitution, SUN
SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 2001, 28A, available at 2001 WL 22763920; William Carlsen, Rights Violations,
Abuses Alleged by Detainees: Beatings, Lack of Legal Representation Cited, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19,
2001, AI2, available at 2001 WL 3417445; Cheng, supra note 151.
157. Cheng, supra note 151.
158. See Cheng, supra note 151; Sun Sentinel Editorial, supra note 156; Carlsen, supra note
156.
159. See Carlsen, supra note 156.
160. See Cheng, supra note 151.
161. Sun Sentinel Editorial, supra note 156.
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danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to
appear for any scheduled proceeding.
62
Thus, section 1226(c) presents a two-fold problem for so-called
"deportable" aliens: (1) it deprives them of an individual consideration of
whether they ought to be detained or ought to be released on bond, prior
to any actual decision that a removal order will result; and (2) by omit-
ting any mention of a time limit for such detention or for the determina-
tion of whether to issue a removal order, it places them in jeopardy of a
potentially unlimited detention, without any hearing. 63
Once an alien has received a final removal order, their detention and
deportation is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. '64 However, many aliens
facing removal orders are unable to be deported, "either because their
foreign citizenship cannot be clearly established or because their country
of origin is unwilling to accept them.' 65 In Ho v. Greene,'6 the Tenth
Circuit considered the detention of a removable alien under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), and found statutory authority to indefinitely detain an alien
who cannot be removed within the ninety-day removal period and who
the Attorney General determines to present either a flight risk or a secu-
rity risk. 167 In upholding the constitutionality of such indefinite detention,
the Tenth Circuit determined that an alien who has been ordered re-
moved retains no liberty interest, and therefore has not been deprived
constitutional Due Process. 
68
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Zadvydas v.
Davis,'69 and rejected the authority of the INS to indefinitely detain these
"un-deportable" aliens.' 70 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
expressly overturned both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, finding that the
indefinite detention of a resident alien facing a final removal order raises
serious Fifth Amendment Due Process issues.' 7' The Supreme Court held
that the post-removal detention period of an "un-deportable" alien under
§ 1231 must contain an implicit reasonableness limitation, and that the
presumptive limit would be six months.' 72 In light of the Supreme Court's
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (1999).
163. See § 1226(c)(2).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2001).
165. Barry J. Lipson, Federally Speaking, 3 No. 18 LAW. J. 6, 6 (2001). See generally Victoria
Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: The Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United
States, 79 TEx. L. REv. 769, 773-74 (2001) (discussing the plight of the so-called "stateless" aliens,
those without citizenship of any country, who therefore cannot be deported).
166. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000).
167. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1056.
168. See id. at 1058-59.
169. 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001).
170. See Zadvydas, 121 S.Ct. at 2505.
171. See id. at 2498.
172. See id. at 2505.
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decision in Zadvydas, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ho likely carries
little precedential value.
However, neither the Zadvydas decision, nor the Tenth Circuit rul-
ing in Ho, is directly binding upon whether the mandatory detention of
aliens who have yet to receive a final removal order is constitutional.' 73
With neither binding Supreme Court nor Tenth Circuit precedent as to
the matter of the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c), it is not
surprising that the district courts are split as to the constitutionality of the
provision.' 74 This survey examines the split within the Tenth Circuit as to
this issue, and discusses the Seventh Circuit decision that directly con-
sidered and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory detention pro-
vision."
B. Current Confusion under § 1226(c)
1. Tenth Circuit Split: Mandatory Detention as Unconstitutional
a. Son Vo v. Greene'
7 6
i. Facts
In Son Vo v. Greene, the District Court considered the detention,
without bond, of Son Dien Vo, a lawful permanent resident facing po-
tential deportation due to his conviction for Bank Fraud and aiding and
abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.17  Vo, a na-
tive of Vietnam, had been living in Denver as a lawful permanent resi-
dent of the United States at the time of his conviction.' Vo appealed the
immigration judge's determination that Vo was statutorily ineligible for
bond as an aggravated felon, claiming that the mandatory statutory de-




173. Although the Supreme Court briefly addressed section 1226(c) in dicta, it specifically
limited its holding to those aliens already facing removal orders but who are nonetheless "un-
deportable," stating that "the issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself
unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United
States." Id. at 2503.
174. See Son Vo v. Greene, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (D. Colo. 2000); Gonzalez-Portillo v.
Reno, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999); Kwon v. Comfort, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Colo. 2001).
175. See Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999). Despite the continuing disagreement
as to the constitutionality of the provision, no other Circuit has directly confronted this issue since.
See Son Vo v. Greene, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (D. Colo. 2000).
176. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D. Colo. 2000).
177. See Son Vo, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1282.
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In assessing the constitutionality of the provision, Judge Kane re-
jected the reasoning of three prior bench decisions, which followed the
Seventh Circuit decision in Parra v. Perryman 8 upholding the constitu-
tionality of § 1226(c). 8 ' Judge Kane distinguished Parra, where the alien
was fully deportable to Mexico, with the case at bar, where Vo could not
be deported to Vietnam even if he received a final removal order.1
8 2
Judge Kane, in enjoining the INS from applying § 1226(c) to Vo, held
that the mandatory provision "deprived [Vo] of his liberty without due
process of law," concluding that "due process requires that a person
'charged' with being an aggravated felon be afforded the opportunity to
present evidence establishing that he is not what he is merely 'charged'
to be."'83
b. Gonzalez-Portillo v. Reno'8"
i. Facts
A few months after Judge Kane's decision in Son Vo, Federal Mag-
istrate Judge Coan considered the detention of a lawful permanent resi-
dent facing deportation proceedings based on her convictions for multi-
ple crimes of moral turpitude and for her aggravated felony conviction.'
8 5
The petitioner, Gonzalez-Portillo, although a citizen of El Salvador who
originally entered the United States as an undocumented alien, obtained
lawful permanent resident status in 1989.186 Eleven years later, Gonzalez-
Portillo pled guilty to two counts of forgery, a third degree felony.8 7 She
received a sentence of an indeterminate term, not to exceed five years,
but served only fifteen days in county jail.
88
Subsequently, the INS initiated removal proceedings.'89 Gonzalez-
Portillo challenged her removability, claiming that her status as a lawful
permanent resident provided her with immunity from removal, that she
did not commit an aggravated felony for deportation purposes, and that
the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) violates her Fifth
Amendment right to Due Process and her Eighth Amendment right to
reasonable bond."'
ii. Decision
180. 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999). See discussion, infra, Part ll.B.2.a.
181. See Son Vo, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
182. See id.
183. Son Vo, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1283-84.
184. 2000 WL 33191534 (D. Colo. 2000).








After rejecting her first two claims, the court considered Gonzalez-
Portillo's claim of the unconstitutionality of the mandatory detention
provision.' 9' First, the court determined that a strict scrutiny standard
must be applied to the government's provision, requiring that the INS
"demonstrate that the detention of aliens without opportunity for release
pending finalization of removal proceedings is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest." '92 Next, having determined that the
Congress has a compelling interest in preventing the flight of criminal
aliens and the commission of additional crimes, the court considered
whether section 1226(c)'s detention requirement was excessive in rela-
tion to that interest.
9 3
Here, the court considered the mandatory nature of the provision,
which "does not afford the Attorney General any discretion to make an
individualized determination about whether the reasons justifying Con-
gress' enactment of the detention statute apply to a particular alien."' 9
Additionally, the court noted the indefinite nature of the requirement, as
the provision failed to provide any specific time limit for the issuance of
a final removal order.' 95 Based on both the inflexible nature of the provi-
sion, and the potentially indefinite detentions that it authorized, the mag-
istrate deemed § 1226(c) unconstitutional and ordered that the INS must
provide Gonzalez-Portillo with an individualized bond hearing "to de-
termine whether she presents a substantial risk of flight or a threat to
persons or property. ' -
c. Mandatory Detention as Constitutional: Kwon v. Comfort
97
i. Facts
In Kwon, a Colorado district court considered the mandatory deten-
tion provision of IIRIRA as it addressed an appeal from a lawful perma-
nent resident facing immigration proceedings pursuant to his conviction
for an aggravated felony.'98 The petitioner, a Korean citizen but a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of second and
third degree sexual assault and received a sentence of nine months in jail
191. See id at *5.
192. Id. at *7. In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the language of Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), which "distinguished the juvenile alien's liberty interest from a
fundamental liberty interest such as 'freedom from physical restraint' in the sense of a barred cell."
Id. at *6.
193. See id. at *8.
194. Id. at*10.
195. See id.
196. Id. at *12.
197. 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Colo. 2001).
198. See Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
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followed by eight years of probation.'" Subsequently, the INS initiated
removal proceedings against Kwon as an aggravated felon.2 °
ii. Court's Reasoning
Here, the court rejected the petitioner's argument that the mandatory
detention provision is unconstitutional, and instead followed the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Parra.20' The court's analysis focused first on Con-
gress' "near-complete power over immigration," which stems from more
than mere Constitutional authority, but also from an inherent sovereign
right "to determine which aliens it will admit or expel. ' 2tO Next, the court
applied a relaxed standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the pro-
vision, requiring only that the provision be "bas[ed] upon a facially le-
gitimate and bona fide reason." 203
In applying this "facially legitimate" purpose test, the court con-
cluded that the detention requirement, along with IRIRA as a whole,
serves a legitimate governmental purpose by preventing the risk of flight
as well as the risk of further criminal activities through the duration of
the removal proceedings.20 Moreover, the court noted that even prior to
IIRIRA, the release of an alien pending removal proceedings was a mat-
ter of discretion, rather than entitlement.205 Finally, the court asserted that
the detention under § 1226(c) "is not indefinite but is limited to the time
it takes to adjudicate the removal proceedings, consider any request Peti-
tioner makes for relief from removal ... and, if relief is rejected, to exe-
cute the final order of removal. ' 2 6 Based on these considerations, the
court in Kwon upheld 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) as constitutional.O'
2. Other Circuits
a. Parra v. Perryman208
i. Facts
In Parra v. Perryman, the Seventh Circuit considered and upheld
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), requiring the mandatory de-
tention of a deportable alien pending removal proceedings. 209 Manuel
Parra, a Mexican citizen convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault,
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 1146.
202. Id. at 1144-45.
203. Id. at 1146 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794-95 (1977)).
204. Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See id at 1144.
208. 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
209. See Parra, 172 F.3d at 958.
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was held by the INS pending a final removal order.2t In his appeal, Parra
conceded both that he was an alien and that he had been convicted of an
aggravated felony for removal purposes."' Accordingly, Parra presented
no doubt as to the fact that his removal order would be made final, but
only challenged whether the INS could detain him until such an order
was officially issued.2 2
ii. Decision
In addressing Parra's claim, the Seventh Circuit relied both on the
plain language of § 1226(c), which mandates the detention of aliens who
are "deportable," and on the immediate facts before it.2 3 The court noted
that Parra's case, where his ultimate deportability was not in question,
presented no dilemma but that there might be closer cases:
[I]t is easy to imagine cases - for example, claims by persons de-
tained under § 1226(c) who say that they are citizens rather than ali-
ens, who contend that they have not been convicted of one of the
felonies that authorizes removal, or who are detained indefinitely be-
cause the nation of which they are citizens will not take them back -
in which resort to the Great Writ may be appropriate. Today's case
presents none of these possibilities, however, for Parra concedes that
he is an alien removable because of his criminal conviction, and
214Mexico accepts return of its citizens.
After comparing Parra's liberty interest with the government's need to
prevent his flight, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional bar to
Parra' s detention.2 3
3. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit's holding must be construed extremely nar-
rowly, for it evaluated the constitutionality of the mandatory detention
requirement not on its face, but only as applied to these particular facts.
26
The court assessed Parra's liberty interest not as "liberty in the abstract,
but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to remain
in this country but eligible to live at liberty in his native land. 2 Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit did not actually address the constitution-
ality of the detention as applied to a resident alien contesting either his or
218her legal status or the nature of the criminal conviction.
210. See id. at 955.
211. See id. at 956.
212. See id
213. See id. at 957.
214. Id.
215. See Parra, 172 F.3d at 958.
216. See id. at 957.
217. Id.
218. See id at 957.
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In Kwon v. Comfort, the Colorado district court's reasoning is
flawed in two major ways. First, in upholding the statute's detention pro-
vision, the court describes the decision to release an alien pending re-
moval as one that has traditionally been discretionary." 9 Based on this
premise, the court ultimately ends up preserving a statute that removes
this traditional discretion, and instead requires a mandatory detention.2
Second, the court's reliance on Parra may be misplaced. While Parra
focused specifically on a defendant who conceded all aspects of his re-
movability,22' the court in Kwon makes no mention of whether the defen-
dant had conceded his ultimate removability.2
With no on-point precedent as to the constitutionality of the man-
datory detention of lawful permanent residents prior to a final removal
order, the confusion within the Tenth Circuit is understandable. How-
ever, given the recent surge in INS activity as against both illegal immi-
grants and aliens lawfully present within the United States, the Due Pro-
cess limitations on alien confinement will become increasingly impor-
tant.
CONCLUSION
Throughout American history, our national crises have been re-
flected in our legal treatment of immigrants, from the restrictions on
Japanese-Americans following the attack on Pearl Harbor 223 to the recent
USA Patriot Act, passed in swift response to the September I 11h terrorist
attacks on America.224 While excluding or deporting those aliens who
lack any established ties to and who pose significant safety threats to
American society is certainly a worthwhile goal, the achievement of this
goal must be tempered with reasonableness and limited by the constitu-
tional restraint of Due Process, particularly regarding those aliens law-
fully present.
The "aggravated felony" category, as repeatedly expanded by Con-
gress and broadly interpreted by the courts, has resulted in total upheaval
for countless non-citizens who have lived peaceably in the United States
for the majority of their lives. Additionally, these same non-citizens face
a mandatory detention prior to any final determination of their remov-
ability, regardless of any flight or safety risk they pose. The allowance of
this constitutionally questionable practice not only risks the integrity of
the Due Process clause, but drains INS resources on the detention of
219. See Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
220. See id. at 1146-47.
221. See Parra, 172 F.3d at 957.
222. See id. at 956.
223. See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding as
constitutional federal legislation placing both curfew restrictions and geographic exclusions upon all
persons of Japanese ancestry, whether U.S. citizens or immigrants).
224. See notes 148-162, supra, and accompanying text.
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relatively harmless individuals rather than in the pursuit of the truly dan-
gerous elements in our society. In order to ensure a constitutional and
level response to threats on our national security, the courts must be
vigilant in reviewing the legal treatment of immigrants in America in the
coming months.
Kathleen O'Rourke

